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POWER AND PROCEDURE IN
TEXAS BAIL-SETTING
Amanda Woog & Nathan Fennell*
ABSTRACT
As advocates’, lawyers’, and legislators’ bail reform efforts intensify in
Texas and throughout the country, we consider the limits of pretrial proce-
dural protections when judges do not follow the law, access to courts is
limited, and people do not have quality assistance of counsel. Given this
reality in most bail-setting courts in Texas, formal procedural require-
ments, like mandating that bail-setting magistrates consider certain factors
when making initial bail decisions, do not achieve their promise. More than
a procedural or legal problem to be addressed, we consider the nation’s
addiction to pretrial detention as one that was created by—and must be
addressed through—exercises of social and political power. We identify
ways that organizers are working to shift power in the pretrial context, en-
courage lawyers and activists alike to think about legal change in this arena
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaningful reform, and hope
to inspire further collaboration toward the power-shifting goals we see as
necessary for long-term success.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CASH is an unjust and ineffective proxy for determining whether aperson should be detained pretrial.1 The cash bail system has re-sulted in millions of people being caged pretrial simply because
they lack the financial resources to purchase their liberty.2 Compounded
by racialized policing and court practices, the money bail system dispro-
portionately targets Black and poor people, operating as a system of ra-
cial control.3 The impacts are profound: families are separated,4 jobs and
housing have been lost,5 and the people in jail pretrial face a greater
1. See ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1132 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d
in part, reversed in part, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), withdrawn and substituted by 892 F.3d
147 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The reliable evidence in the present record shows no meaningful
difference in pretrial failures to appear or arrests on new criminal activity between misde-
meanor defendants released on secured bond and on unsecured financial conditions. But
even a few days in pretrial detention on misdemeanor charges correlates with—and is caus-
ally related to—higher rates of failure to appear and new criminal activity during pretrial
release and beyond. Misdemeanor pretrial detention is causally related to the snowballing
effects of cumulative disadvantage that are especially pronounced and pervasive for those
who are indigent and African-American or Latino.”); see also Lisa Foster, Off. for Access
to Just., Remarks at the American Bar Association’s 11th Annual Summit on Public De-
fense (Feb. 6, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/director-lisa-foster-office-access-
justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-annual-summit [https://perma.cc/C29W-425K] (“Bail
exacerbates and perpetuates poverty because of course only people who cannot afford the
bail assessed or to post a bond—people who are already poor—are held in custody pre-
trial. As a consequence, they often lose their jobs, may lose their housing, be forced to
abandon their education, and likely are unable to make their child support payments.”);
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1354 (2014) (“[Being jailed] increases the likelihood that detainees will commit future
crimes, substantially impacts the quality of their defense, and encourages plea bargains—
all of which increase the likelihood that the detainee will be convicted, imprisoned, and
subjected to prolonged deprivation of liberty, privacy, and other fundamental elements of
human existence.”); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXAN-
DER HOLSINGER, ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, 10–11
(2013) https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-
costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C965-YKLJ] (finding correlation between pretrial deten-
tion and increased likelihood of failures to appear, new criminal activity, and post-disposi-
tion recidivism).






3. Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determina-
tions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 938 (2013) (noting that “nearly every study”
on the topic has found that African Americans are disproportionately affected); see also
Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (“[T]he [criminal] court system largely legitimizes and perpetuates the
racialized violence and control of police and prisons widely criticized by abolitionists.”).
4. SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS & AZADEH
ZOHRABI, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., WHO PAYS? THE TRUST COST OF INCAR-
CERATION ON FAMILIES 31–35 (2015) (describing the impact on families from forced sepa-
ration by incarceration).
5. LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE DENIED:
THE HARMFUL AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 4 (2019) (“Studies on
pretrial detention have found that even a small number of days in custody awaiting trial
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chance of conviction and longer sentences.6
Using access to cash to determine whether a person is jailed or freed
pretrial also raises constitutional issues. People who cannot pay cash bail
or the typical 10% bondsman’s fee for release are held “pretrial,”7 while
those who can pay the set amount are freed, despite the U.S. Supreme
Court’s having long held that “the State . . . may not . . . imprison a
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay [a fine or restitu-
tion].”8 That case, Bearden v. Georgia,9 and United States v. Salerno,10
which affirmed the importance of procedural protections for people de-
tained pretrial without bail in the federal system, are now being used in
federal courts to challenge state and local cash bail systems.11
As a result, the past five years have seen significant litigation and doc-
trinal development around the constitutional framework for setting bail
in local courts. Though it failed to answer the substantive question of
when a person’s pretrial liberty may be restrained by the state, ODonnell
v. Harris County represented the most significant legal development in
Texas in generations by setting the procedural bar for how judges should
initially set bail—establishing that judges cannot automatically set an
unaffordable bail without considering whether some other amount and
type of bail condition would be appropriate.12 However, our observations
on the ground show that the procedural protections against wealth-based
detention that ODonnell promised are rarely, if ever, being realized in
local courts. Courts continue to decline to inquire into defendants’ finan-
cial situations, making it impossible to comply with ODonnell’s require-
ment that courts take into account ability to pay when setting bail.13 Put
simply, these courts routinely violate settled constitutional law.
In criminal courts across the country, there is an enormous gap be-
tween established constitutional law and everyday practice.14 Using
ODonnell and its impact on the ground as a case study, this Essay ad-
can have many negative effects, . . . harming [the arrestees’] housing stability and employ-
ment status.”).
6. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497,
555 (2012) (“Several studies show that incarcerated defendants are more likely than those
released pretrial to be found, or to plead, guilty and serve prison time.”).
7. Pretrial is largely a misnomer with less than 3% of state and federal criminal cases
going to trial. RICK JONES, GERALD B. LEFCOURT, BARRY J. POLLACK, NORMAN L.
REIMER & KYLE O’DOWD, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. OF DEF. LAWS. THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE
IT 5 (2018).
8. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1983).
9. Id.
10. 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
11. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
12. Id. at 157–61.
13. See id. at 163 (“[T]he County must implement the constitutionally-necessary pro-
cedures to engage in a case-by-case evaluation of a given arrestee’s circumstances, taking
into account . . . ability to pay.”).
14. ALEC KARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS IN THE
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM 15 (2019) (observing constitutional violations of poor peo-
ple’s rights in criminal courts “are simultaneously illegal and the norm”); see also Justin
Murray, Policing Procedural Errors in the Lower Criminal Courts, 89 FORDHAM. L. REV.
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dresses a straightforward problem: local courts are not complying with
established law. We argue that the enforcement issue is not one of doc-
trine or process, but rather one of power. Drawing on a range of grass-
roots organizing strategies already at work,15 we propose power-shifting
approaches to enforce constitutional law. We see these approaches as
part of a broader movement to shift power away from state actors and
toward impacted people and communities.16
II. WHEN COURTS IGNORE THE LAW
Maranda ODonnell was twenty-two years old with a four-year-old
daughter when she was arrested for a misdemeanor traffic offense in Har-
ris County, Texas.17 Her bail was set at $2,500, and because she could not
pay that amount or a bondsman’s fee, she was detained in the Harris
County Jail.18 She told counsel, “I was never asked if I could afford my
bail . . . I live paycheck to paycheck[.] I’m worried about whether my job
will still be there when I get out. I cannot afford to buy my release from
jail.”19
In 2016, attorneys with Civil Rights Corps, Susman Godfrey LLP, and
Texas Fair Defense Project filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of Ms.
ODonnell and others in the Harris County Jail who were detained on
misdemeanor charges and could not afford bail.20 The lawsuit “alleg[ed]
that Harris County’s postarrest incarceration policies and practices im-
posed a ‘wealth-based detention system’ of keeping misdemeanor de-
fendants in jail only because they could not pay secured money bail, while
those who could pay were promptly released, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”21 Af-
ter an eight-day evidentiary hearing in 2017, the district court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, making extensive find-
1411, 1412–13 (2020) (describing how lower courts allowed routine shackling of people
charged with crimes, despite the requirement of individualized circumstances).
15. See Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73
STAN. L. REV. 821, 853 (2021) (“[M]ovement law scholars study actually existing forms of
social movement resistance: campaigns for legal and political change as well as prefigura-
tive arrangements or experiments. The work shows a care and a concern for the unique
contributions of social movements not simply in representing subordinated peoples, but as
a locus for experiments, processes, and imaginations for transformational change.”).
16. See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778,
803 (2021) (“The power lens gets at a separate objective, broadly stated as shifting power
away from the police and toward the populations who are policed, people who are often
poor and Black, Latinx, or Indigenous.”); Clair & Woog, supra note 3 (identifying power-
shifting as an abolitionist strategy); see also Wendy R. Calaway & Jennifer M. Kinsley,
Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 795, 795 (2018) (describing the limitations of
a litigation-based reform strategy).
17. Memorandum and Opinion Approving the Proposed Consent Decree and Settle-
ment Agreement, ODonnell v. Harris County, No. 4:16-cv-01414, 2019 WL 6219933, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2019).
18. ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
19. Memorandum and Opinion Approving the Proposed Consent Decree and Settle-
ment Agreement, supra note 17, at *1.
20. Id. at *47.
21. Id. at *3.
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ings of fact and conclusions of law.22
The defendants appealed, and in 2018, the Fifth Circuit decided ODon-
nell v. Harris County,23 later described as both “historic”24 and “ground-
breaking.”25 The Fifth Circuit decision affirmed that the Harris County
bail system violated the due process and equal protection rights of people
arrested for misdemeanors by setting bail without any meaningful consid-
eration of what amount the person could pay or whether any other non-
monetary conditions would reasonably accomplish the same goals as se-
cured cash bail.26 The panel primarily relied on factual evidence that
magistrates were using a bail schedule to set money bail for people ar-
rested on misdemeanors after only a cursory consideration of the allega-
tions and without inquiring into the person’s financial situation, and that
they were categorically denying arrestees personal bonds at the direction
of elected judges who hired them.27 For people without access to cash,
money bail was a de facto detention order.28
The ODonnell court stuck a procedural band-aid on the wealth-based
detention problem the plaintiffs sought to redress. Rather than providing
clear guidance on the circumstances under which the state may detain a
person pretrial, the court presented a scheme of procedural protections
that must be afforded to a person who is to be detained pretrial on money
bond.29 Though the ODonnell court left open the question of whether a
person can be detained pretrial when alternative conditions of release
would adequately serve the government’s interests, ODonnell’s procedu-
ral requirements should have still been a shake-up for the Texas criminal
22. Id. at *4.
23. 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
24. Gabrielle Banks, Appeals Court Approves Most of Federal Ruling that Harris
County’s Bail Practices Unconstitutional, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://
www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Appeals-court-affirms-federal-ruling-
on-Harris-12614456.php [https://perma.cc/2EGK-LKH5]; see also Meagan Flynn, In His-
toric Decision, Federal Judge Says Harris County Bail System Is Unfair to the Poor, HOUS.
PRESS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.houstonpress.com/news/federal-judge-says-harris-
county-bail-system-is-unfair-to-poor-defendants-9397124 [https://perma.cc/JTZ7-AVPY].
25. Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 91–92 (2018) (“The
ongoing role of class in the adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights was also
recently on display in a groundbreaking set of criminal procedure cases involving money
bail.”).
26. See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 154.
29. Id. at 163 (“[T]he County must implement the constitutionally-necessary proce-
dures to engage in a case-by-case evaluation of a given arrestee’s circumstances, taking into
account the various factors required by Texas state law (only one of which is ability to pay).
These procedures are: notice, an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48
hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decisionmaker.”). William Stuntz
has argued that judge-created criminal constitutional procedure “has substantial unap-
preciated costs,” including incentivizing overcriminalization, creating protections much
more likely to be available to rich defendants, and raising the potential for racial discrimi-
nation. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Proce-
dure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3, 30 (1997). Rather, courts should intervene in
other non-procedural ways: through substantive constitutional regulation and require-
ments for defense funding. See id. at 75–76.
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courts that determine bail.30 Courts may not automatically assign secured
money bail in every case;31 rather, they are required to consider each
person’s case individually—including the person’s ability to pay a secured
bail and whether unsecured bail would be more appropriate—before set-
ting an amount and type of bail.32
Despite ODonnell’s having been decided in 2018, Texas courts fre-
quently violate its central holding. The practices that led to the ODonnell
ruling—routine setting of money bail for misdemeanor offenses without
meaningful consideration of the person’s individual circumstances or abil-
ity to pay33—are ubiquitous in Texas. After ODonnell it is clear that, as a
matter of law, those practices are unconstitutional,34 yet there has been
no indication that courts or counties across Texas have changed their
practices to comply with this newly clarified constitutional requirement.
Rather, available evidence suggests that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
ODonnell has not led to any meaningful change in the vast majority of
Texas jurisdictions, which continue to violate the Constitution with their
bail-setting practices. Below, we summarize this evidence.
First, evidence from pending court cases reveals no significant changes
in bail practices following the Fifth Circuit’s ODonnell ruling. In Daves v.
Dallas County, video evidence from July 2018 “reveal[ed] that Magistrate
Judges routinely deny personal release bonds. The vast majority of ar-
restees are instead given secured financial conditions of release.”35 It also
showed “Magistrate Judges still routinely treat the [bail] schedules as
binding, and make no adjustment in light of an arrestee’s inability to
pay.”36 These are remarkably similar practices to those struck down by
federal courts in Harris County in 2018.37 Galveston County similarly
continued to operate an unconstitutional bail schedule, even after the
30. See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 164–66.
31. We use the term “secured money bail” to refer to money that must be paid, in the
form of cash or a surety bond, before a person can be released from jail, which in Texas
correlates with a “bail bond.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.02 (West 2015). This is
different from “unsecured money bail,” which allows someone to be released from jail
without paying money up-front, but with the promise that if you do not appear in court,
you will pay the set amount to the court. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 153. In Texas, that is
referred to as a “personal bond.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (West 2017).
Once a person has been arrested, there is no mechanism in Texas law to release them
without either a secured or unsecured financial bond, unlike many states that have some
version of a “release on recognizance” option available. Ryan Kellus Turner & Henry W.
Knight, Making it Personal in the Age of Bail Reform: The Misunderstanding, Utility, and
Limits of Personal Bonds in Texas, 20 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 67, 74–75 (2019).
32. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 1993). Even prior to ODonnell,
many courts had been ignoring article 17.15(4), which describes the factors a magistrate
must consider when setting bail and requires that “[t]he ability to make bail is to be re-
garded, and proof may be taken upon this point.” Id. art. 17.15(4).
33. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 153.
34. Id. at 161.
35. Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part
and remanded, 984 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated, 988 F.3d
834 (5th Cir. 2021).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 691–93.
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Fifth Circuit’s first ruling in ODonnell.38
Second, in other parts of Texas where it is possible to observe bail-
setting,39 we have seen no meaningful consideration of ability to pay or
alternatives to cash bail. Texas Fair Defense Project staff members and
interns have observed magistration proceedings in multiple counties since
the ODonnell ruling and have heard from people who have been the sub-
jects of those hearings in many counties. In courts where people do not
have defense counsel at bail-setting hearings (the vast majority of courts),
magistrates continue not to inquire into or consider ability to pay bail,
violating the Fifth Circuit’s requirements.
Finally, both before and after ODonnell, magistrates setting bail in
Texas typically do not ask people about their finances before setting bail,
which makes it impossible for them to consider that person’s ability to
pay. In most counties, the only time a court considers finances is if the
person requests a court-appointed lawyer and fills out a financial affidavit
for the purposes of appointment of counsel.40 But that often happens af-
ter the magistrate has already set bail, and the magistrate does not even
look at the financial affidavit (in many counties still referred to as a “pau-
per’s oath”) unless they are also tasked with appointing counsel.41 Some
counties still maintain a written bond schedule on their websites.42
This is not just a Texas problem. Researchers in Georgia found that
statewide practices there had largely failed to shift after new federal ap-
pellate and state legislative requirements mandating that magistrates con-
sider ability to pay when setting bail.43 After the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion in Walker v. City of Calhoun44 and a new state statute explicitly
requiring ability-to-pay findings before setting misdemeanor bail, re-
searchers found that less than half of the counties in the study made any
financial inquiry at all before setting bail.45 Only two counties engaged in
the “full financial evaluation required by [Georgia law].”46 Texas is not
unique, then, in the judiciary’s refusal to consider someone’s finances
38. Booth v. Galveston County, 352 F. Supp. 3d 718, 730, 744 (S.D. Tex. 2019), argued
No. 19-40785 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2020) (“[A]lthough the County contends that ‘steps have
been taken to put in place additional procedural safeguards to ensure an arrestee’s ability
to pay is taken into consideration,’ the record is not altogether clear as to what actual
changes have been made to the County’s bail setting process.”).
39. The difficulty of observing these hearings and the impact of that opacity on the
potential for systemic change is discussed infra, Section III(A).
40. See, e.g., Booth, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 725–26 (describing one such practice in Galves-
ton County in 2018).
41. See id. at 726.
42. E.g., Standard Bond Schedule, LEON CNTY, TEX., https://www.co.leon.tx.us/page/
leon.DCCriminal [https://perma.cc/CZ5G-N6SP].
43. Andrea Woods, Sandra G. Mayson, Lauren Sudeall, Guthrie Armstrong &
Anthony Potts, Boots and Bail on the Ground: Assessing the Implementation of Misde-
meanor Bail Reforms in Georgia, 54 GA. L. REV. 1235, 1269–70 (2020).
44. 901 F.3d. 1245, 1272 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[B]ecause [the City] has effectively con-
ceded that its original bail policy was unconstitutional, the district court may enjoin a re-
turn to that original policy.”).
45. Woods et al., supra note 43, at 1256.
46. Id.
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before assessing cash bail in the face of clear legal mandates to do so.47
Acknowledging and reckoning with the failure of judges to comply with
settled bail law is especially necessary in this moment, as counties and
states across the country undertake “bail reform.”48
Thus, people who get arrested in Texas today fare largely the same as
they did before the ODonnell ruling. The procedural requirements estab-
lished by the court have not been widely adopted by bail-setting magis-
trates, whose intransigence is enabled by the lack of accessibility to those
proceedings and the lack of a robust institutional public defense function
to ensure that the law will be applied in individual cases.49
III. POWER SHIFTING TO ENFORCE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The experience post-ODonnell lays bare the fact that legal doctrine is
not self-executing; it requires judges and other powerful actors to follow
and implement it. Even more, judges have shown that we cannot depend
on them to recognize or enforce the constitutional rights of poor people
in their day-to-day courtroom practices. There have been historic mo-
ments of constitutional crisis in the United States when other branches of
government refused to comply with constitutional law; for example, when
governors refused to desegregate schools following Brown v. Board of
47. For an exploration of the problem of lower courts not implementing or complying
with the law, see Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901, 903 (2015) (challenging the assumption “that courts nearly always comply with
controlling doctrine, except perhaps in areas of profound political or cultural
disagreement”).
48. The highest courts in Massachusetts, Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949,
954 (Mass. 2017), and California, In re Humphrey, 482 P.3d 1008, 1021 (Cal. 2021), have
recently ruled that courts must take into account a defendant’s financial resources when
setting bail amounts. Unfortunately, some evidence suggests that these new requirements
have had minimal impact on the states’ respective pretrial detention practices. See GEN.
CT. OF MASS., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO EVALUATE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE CURRENT BAIL SYSTEM 12 n.11 (2019) (finding that re-
lease and detention statistics “remained largely consistent” when comparing the seventeen-
month periods before and after the Brangan decision); JOHANNA LACOE, ALISSA SKOG &
MIA BIRD, CAL. POL’Y LAB, BAIL REFORM IN SAN FRANCISCO: PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
INTENSIVE SUPERVISION INCREASED AFTER HUMPHREY 1 (2021) (finding a slight increase
in releases but a significant increase in pretrial supervision conditions and no measurable
effect on the overall jail population in San Francisco following the Humphrey decision).
49. The term “magistrate” under Texas law includes essentially any judge of any court
with authority over any other function, including a number of judicial positions explicitly
established for the purpose of making bail decisions. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
2.09 (West 2021). While any magistrate can set initial bail in a case, in practice it is often
done by some combination of justices of the peace and municipal judges in more rural
areas, and by dedicated bail hearing officers in more densely populated areas. We use the
term “magistrate” to refer to any judicial officer who sets the initial bail in a case but will
not preside over the case later if charges are formally filed, which is how the vast majority
of bail-setting occurs in Texas. Some are directly elected, such as justices of the peace;
some are appointed or hired by the locally elected judges and report to them, like the
hearing officers in Harris County; and others are hired by the mayor or city council on a
fixed-term contract, such as many municipal court judges.
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Education, revealing the lack of judicial power to execute the law.50 But
what happens when judges do not execute the law in the one place where
they have the power to do so: their own courtroom? What of the routine
constitutional violations that occur on a daily basis in criminal courts
across the country? How do we get Texas courts to comply with settled
bail law?
Power is at the root of the problem: judges do not follow the law be-
cause they have the power to disregard it, and the people who suffer the
violations have historically lacked the power to push back. Jocelyn Si-
monson’s work on policing offers a model for examining the issue of re-
calcitrant bail courts through a “power lens.”51 She writes, “A focus on
power . . . asks whether directly impacted people have real influence on
the scope and policies of policing in their neighborhoods, counties, cities,
and states.”52 Simonson defines power as the ability “to influence policy
outcomes . . . and control the distribution of state resources . . . . to make
decisions with observable results, whether it is through the power to en-
act policy or the power to check state actors.”53
As Simonson’s work suggests, enforcing individual rights in the pretrial
process would require shifting power to the communities most affected
by the violations.54 A power-shifting approach would seek to empower
those communities to regulate the pretrial system by including methods
to check the court players who permit and perpetuate daily constitutional
violations.55 This approach “depends on an understanding that the mass
criminalization of the last century has had racialized, community-level ef-
fects in neighborhoods that are most heavily targeted for policing and
from which the most people have been incarcerated,” and it recognizes
the role legal elites have had in creating and perpetuating this system.56
This is not to say that doctrine does not play an important role. Indeed,
there are different legal regimes that are more or less effective in realiz-
ing constitutional rights and ultimately ending wealth-based detention
and reducing pretrial detention.57 For example, the consent decree en-
50. See The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP LEGAL
DEF. FUND, https://naacpldf.org/ldf-celebrates-60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education/
southern-manifesto-massive-resistance-brown [https://perma.cc/8YQC-XLP4]; see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The judiciary] may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”).
51. Simonson, supra note 16, at 792.
52. Id. at 803.
53. Id. at 804.
54. See id. at 813–14.
55. See id. at 853.
56. Id. at 504. See generally KARAKATSANIS, supra note 14.
57. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2288–90 (rec-
ommending regime that responds with support rather than detention or surveillance with
respect to criminogenic risk). Advocates, scholars, and policymakers should consider struc-
tural design questions, including how and whether judges will implement reforms, when
considering changes to legal regimes. For example, Matthew Tokson has shown that
“judges’ aversion to increased decision costs,” such as spending more time on making a
decision, can influence noncompliance. Tokson, supra note 47, at 904.
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tered in ODonnell has meaningfully reduced misdemeanor wealth-based
detention in Harris County,58 likely because it requires a substantive out-
come (release) rather than simply a procedural protection (consideration
of ability to pay).59 But this example also supports our thesis: the
landmark settlement was reached after an unprecedented electoral vic-
tory by judges who, spurred by a years-long campaign by community or-
ganizers, campaigned on bail reform.60 An exploration of the optimal
doctrinal framework for connecting constitutional doctrine to everyday
practice is beyond the scope of this Essay, but is an important considera-
tion for attorneys, advocates, and organizers.
Below, we detail power-shifting approaches to enforce ODonnell. We
first identify current structural barriers to enforcing the constitutional
rights of people charged with crimes in the pretrial context, which have
implications for a power-shifting approach to enforcement. These struc-
tural barriers include the lack of access to bail hearings and the lack of
quality defense counsel pretrial. We then identify power-shifting strate-
gies to challenge court pretrial practices, including the routine violation
of constitutional law. Alongside increased access to bail hearings and a
strengthened defense function, these power-shifting approaches could be
effective in enforcing constitutional rights in bail-setting courts amid
broader efforts to create community-based visions for pretrial justice.61
A. THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
As an initial matter, the lack of public access to bail hearings makes it
extremely difficult to observe what judges are doing and should cause
deep public concern.62 In Texas, except in rare circumstances, bail is ini-
58. BRANDON L. GARRETT & SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, THE INDEP. MONITOR
FOR THE ODONNELL V. HARRIS CNTY. DECREE, MONITORING PRETRIAL REFORM IN HAR-
RIS COUNTY: FIRST SIXTH MONTH REPORT OF THE COURT-APPOINTED MONITOR 3 (2020)
(noting the consent decree “represent[ed] the first federal court-supervised remedy gov-
erning bail” and resulted in increased use of personal bond, reduction in racial disparities
for pretrial release, decline in pretrial detention days, and no change in recidivism).
59. Id. at 2 (stating that “Local Rule 9” of the Harris County courts “rescinded the
secured money bail schedule, and provided for a new set of procedures, requiring prompt
release of misdemeanor arrestees except for five carve-out categories of arrestees”).
60. Michael Hardy, How Houston is Leading the Way on Keeping Poor Defendants
Out of Jail, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/
how-houston-leading-way-keeping-poor-defendants-out-jail/ [https://perma.cc/62EE-
FX3E] (“Complicating the county’s case was the fact that voters kept booting out its top
elected defenders in favor of pro-bail-reform candidates.”); see infra note 142.
61. We are not arguing that constitutional enforcement should be a goal in a power-
shifting approach, and indeed it might not be a goal for people, families, and communities
working to change pretrial systems. Rather, constitutional rights can be useful tools in a
broader movement, and power-shifting strategies can help vindicate those rights. See Janet
Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the
Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1291–98 (2015) (framing the
participatory defense movement as a response to the failings of the Sixth Amendment and
a vindication of due process right to be heard); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword:
Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2019) (outlining a theory of an
abolitionist reading of the Constitution).
62. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2175–77 (2014) (arguing that lack of public access to bail hearings is
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tially set by a magistrate within forty-eight hours of a person’s initial ar-
rest.63 This bail-setting hearing usually happens in tandem with the
magistrate’s responsibility to inform the person arrested of certain proce-
dural rights and often coincides with the magistrate’s determination of
probable cause for the arrest in the case of a warrantless arrest64 (which
constitutes the vast majority of arrests in Texas, as elsewhere65). In almost
every jurisdiction in the state, these combination “magistration” hearings
occur physically inside a jail.66 In a number of counties, there are multiple
jail facilities where magistration occurs; in addition to the county jail,67
magistrations are sometimes performed in small, unregulated municipal
lockups.68 In some counties, magistration happens in personam, with the
magistrate physically inside the jail building, along with the people ar-
rested.69 In many parts of Texas, the magistrate appears in the jail only by
video on a closed-circuit television screen—a common practice even long
before the COVID-19 pandemic.70
These custodial bail-setting hearings are nearly impossible for an out-
sider to observe. The hearings often occur at irregular times, without any
notice of when they will be scheduled. Due to their occurrence physically
also unconstitutional). Attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, Texas Fair Defense Project, and
ACLU-TX brought a First Amendment claim on behalf of organizational plaintiffs Faith in
Texas and Texas Organizing Project challenging this practice in Daves v. Dallas County,
341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
63. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West 2017).
64. Id.
65. See Valid Searches and Seizures Without Warrants, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL
L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/valid-searches-and-
seizures-without-warrants [https://perma.cc/UZ27-2S53].
66. See, e.g., Robin Ramsay, Duties and Responsibilities of the Texas Magistrate, TEX.
MUN. CTS. EDUC. CTR. 3 https://www.tmcec.com/files/4414/4985/5485/Duties_and_Respon
sibilities_of_the_Texas_Magistrate_Ramsay_-_New_Magistrates.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZNZ4-RA8Q] (describing in a training for new magistrates that “[j]ail is hardly a [sic]
‘open’ environment (court)”); Interlocal Agreement Between Travis County and City of
Austin for Booking and Related Services, TRAVIS CNTY. 1, http://www.austintexas.gov/
edims/document.cfm?id=274056 [https://perma.cc/FMK9-JML9] (describing Magistration
occurring in the Travis County jail); Jail Questions & Answers, HAYS CNTY., https://hays-
countytx.com/law-enforcement/sheriff/corrections-bureau/jail-questions-answers [https://
perma.cc/A7CV-AT4A] (same for Hays County).
67. See, e.g., Jail Division, THE COLONY, TEX., https://www.thecolonytx.gov/269/Jail-
Division [https://perma.cc/5S6L-6FGS] (“As with all Municipal Jails, persons arrested and
charged with more serious offenses will be booked, arraigned and housed until such time
as they bond out or are transferred to the county sheriff’s department. This usually occurs
within 72 hours.”); Jail Unit, RED OAK, TEX., https://www.redoaktx.org/874/Jail-Unit
[https://perma.cc/33PR-M4ZE] (describing the process of Magistration hearings (referred
to as “arraignment” in the page) in the municipal jail before transferring arrestees to the
county jail).
68. Brandi Grissom, Accountable to No One, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2010), https://
www.texastribune.org/2010/09/17/city-jails-unregulated-despite-deaths-complaints [https://
perma.cc/GK6H-AD3S].
69. E.g., Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in
part, 984 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated, 988 F.3d 834 (5th
Cir. 2021).
70. E.g., Lise Olsen, Videotapes Reveal Flaws in Harris County Bail Bond Hearings,
HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/Videotapes-reveal-flaws-in-Harris-County-bail-10642138.php [https://
perma.cc/7VBV-VXEU].
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inside a jail facility, the public is refused access to the building for pur-
ported security reasons. In counties without a single centralized location
for magistration hearings, an observer might be unable to find out where
someone is being held, where the magistration will take place, or whether
the person is to be transferred to the county jail until the processing is
over. In short, in the vast majority of Texas counties, it is impossible to
observe someone’s bail-setting hearing, whether in person or otherwise.71
Given the lack of public access, the importance of the liberty interest at
stake, and the fact that magistration hearings occur for all levels of al-
leged criminal offenses, one might think that there would be a record of
these hearings for attorneys and the public to view after the hearing has
concluded. Unfortunately, this is usually not so. There is no requirement
that these hearings occur on the record, and a court reporter is rarely
engaged for magistration hearings.72 While some counties do maintain
audio or video recordings of magistration hearings, the practice is incon-
sistent, and the recordings have proven extremely difficult to access, even
in the discovery process of large-scale federal litigation about these pre-
cise practices.73
As a result, bail-setting predominantly occurs in a “black box” where
the only people aware of what was actually said in the hearings are a
magistrate, the (in all likelihood) unrepresented person arrested, and pos-
sibly other state actors like a pretrial services agent or bailiff. It is ex-
71. Mustafa Z. Mirza, In Dallas County, Bail Is Set in Secret—and Often in Seconds,
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/05/Dallas-County-Bail-
Machine [https://perma.cc/3395-T7YR]. Texas courts’ transition to Zoom for many hear-
ings during the COVID-19 pandemic has brought some relief on this front, and several
magistrate courts that were previously unviewable by the public are now streamed live for
the public to watch. We are hopeful that this practice will continue for jurisdictions that use
video technology for bail-setting hearings even after the pandemic, but there is no indica-
tion that this will occur.
72. Technically, Code of Criminal Procedure article 15.17(a) provides for records of
magistration hearings, but they have serious production and retention problems. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West 2017) (“A record of the communication be-
tween the arrested person and the magistrate shall be made. The record shall be preserved
until the earlier of the following dates: (1) the date on which the pretrial hearing ends; or
(2) the 91st day after the date on which the record is made if the person is charged with a
misdemeanor or the 120th day after the date on which the record is made if the person is
charged with a felony.”). Furthermore, the records themselves are not required to be a full
transcription; often the record is a form filled out by the magistrate about the admonitions
given and whether the person requested a court-appointed lawyer, but the form does not
explain what factors went into the bail determination. See id. art. 15.17(f) (“A record re-
quired under Subsection (a) or (e) may consist of written forms, electronic recordings, or
other documentation as authorized by procedures adopted in the county under [the Indi-
gent Defense Plan].”). The Legislature may try to address these problems of documenta-
tion in the future. In 2019, a bill to extend recording timelines passed both chambers
before being vetoed by Governor Abbott. See TEX. SENATE RSCH. CTR., S.B. 815 BILL
ANALYSIS, SRC-ARR S.B. 815 86(R) (2019); Press Release, Office of the Texas Governor,
Governor Abbott vetoes SB 815 (June 15, 2019), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-
abbott-vetoes-sb-815 [https://perma.cc/MTE6-ZJJA].
73. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint–Class Action at 21 n.12, Daves v. Dallas
County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 18-11368), aff’d in, 984 F.3d 381 (5th
Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated, 988 F.3d 834 (5th Cir. 2021) (No. 3:18-CV-
0154-N).
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tremely difficult to monitor judges’ behavior when the public cannot
watch what they are doing or read what happened in the courtroom.74
B. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION
In theory, accused people have the assistance of a lawyer who vindi-
cates their constitutional rights in criminal cases that could result in a
carceral sentence. In practice, this is rarely the case for poor people
charged with crimes in Texas, especially in the pretrial setting.75
Across Texas’s 254 counties, only five counties provide counsel at
magistration in any circumstance (one of those provides it at only some
locations where bail is set, such that only 60% of people charged with
crimes in the county receive counsel).76 At least two more counties pro-
vide lawyers for a “bail review hearing” within forty-eight hours for some
people who are not released after their initial bail-setting, but lawyers are
not provided when bail is first set.77 In the vast majority of counties, ar-
rested persons are booked into jail, presented to magistrates in jails, and
have their bail set—all before having any opportunity to request or con-
sult with a lawyer. This lack of representation significantly impacts a per-
son’s case: having a lawyer dramatically increases the likelihood that a
person will be released on personal bond or have their bail reduced.78
74. This is not to say that no records of the results of the magistration hearing exist,
but none of the underlying information going into the decisions is made public. There is a
public record of the bail amount set but not any of the considerations that went into setting
it. There is a public record of whether a person was appointed a defense lawyer but often
not of the individual’s financial situation or whether that information was available to the
magistrate when the bail amount was set.
75. See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 12 (“By buying less criminal defense, the state can buy
less enforcement of constitutional criminal procedure.”).
76. Brief for Texas Fair Defense Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at
4–7, Booth v. Galveston County, 352 F. Supp. 3d 718 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (No.
3:18–CV–00104), argued No. 19-40785 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2020) (describing the state of coun-
sel at magistration in Texas and outlining the five counties providing it in early 2020). In
the past year, two additional counties in Texas (Potter and Hays) have embarked on one-
year externally funded research projects where half of arrested people are randomly as-
signed to be provided a lawyer at the initial bail-setting hearing while the other half are
not. It is unclear whether those counties will continue providing any amount of representa-
tion at magistration after the grant funding expires. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, AN-
NUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 25 (2021).
77. Booth, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 738 (describing bail review hearings as a “recent change”
in Galveston County); Orders of the Supreme Court and Texas Court of Appeals, EL PASO
CNTY. COURTHOUSE COUNCIL OF JUDGES 8–9 (June 29, 2020), http://www.epcounty.com/
information/courtresponse.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BDW-27EA] (El Paso County describing
bond review dockets).
78. Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Mat-
ter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1719, 1720 (2002) (finding that people represented by counsel at their bail-setting hearing
were two and one half times more likely both to be released on their own recognizance and
to have their bail reduced, and that the absence of counsel at bail-setting was “the single
most important reason for lengthy pretrial incarceration of people charged with nonviolent
crimes”); Declaration of Michael Young at 5, Booth, 352 F. Supp. 3d 718 (No.
3:18–CV–00104) (noting counsel at magistration in Bexar County, Texas, resulted in 77%
of represented clients being released as opposed to 57% of people unrepresented by
counsel).
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The outcome of the bail hearing, in turn, has dramatic implications for
the likelihood that someone will plead guilty, especially for
misdemeanors.79
The effects of the lack of counsel at an initial bail-setting could be
somewhat mitigated by diligent representation by defense counsel as
soon as counsel is appointed. But many people charged with crimes in
Texas are never represented by counsel, especially those who are charged
with misdemeanors.80 Among those accused of felonies in Texas, 88% are
represented by appointed counsel, but that number plummets to 49% for
misdemeanors.81 The pro se rate for people charged with misdemeanors,
as calculated by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission, is 20.4% state-
wide, but that masks extraordinary variation among counties; the esti-
mated pro se rate is over 50% when looking only at counties with a
population under 50,000.82 In too many counties, proceedings with names
ranging from “jail docket”83 to “rocket docket”84 essentially replace bail
advocacy, with opportunities for people charged with misdemeanors to
plead guilty in exchange for their release.85 Thus, a significant number of
people go through their entire misdemeanor case, from arrest to convic-
tion, in state custody without being represented by a lawyer at any point
in the process. These people are unlikely to have formal legal training,
and lack access to resources and information that would enable them to
make legal arguments applying precedent like ODonnell to their cases.
Often, they are prevented from speaking at their bail hearings at all, with
the admonition that what they say could be used against them in subse-
79. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Conse-
quences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–714 (2017); see also
Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1513, 1515 (2013).
80. See Indigent Defense Data for Texas, TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, http://
tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Reports/DataSheet.aspx?cid=1 [https://perma.cc/8DK5-Q8B9].
81. Id.
82. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 76, at 17.
83. Neena Satija, How Judicial Conflicts of Interest are Denying Poor Texans Their
Right to an Effective Lawyer, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/
2019/08/19/unchecked-power-texas-judges-indigent-defense [https://perma.cc/UXC8-
3FRS].
84. Tyler White, District Clerk Expects ‘Rocket Docket’ to Reduce Jail Overcrowding,
MIDLAND REP.-TELEGRAM (July 21, 2013), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/District-
clerk-expects-rocket-docket-to-reduce-7445930.php [https://perma.cc/XQT4-QJNW].
85. See, e.g., Memorandum and Opinion Setting out Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, ODonnell v. Harris County, No. 4:16-cv-01414 at *83–84. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).
(“[T]he typical sentence for those pleading guilty at a first appearance is either the time
already served in pretrial detention, or some number of days that with a two-for-one or
three-for-one credit for the time served would allow release within a day of the first ap-
pearance. . . . [M]isdemeanor defendants abandon valid defenses and plead guilty to obtain
faster release than if they contested their charges.). Unless the purpose is to secure guilty
pleas, this practice is irrational to the extent that a person offered release with a guilty plea
was never offered the opportunity to be released on personal bond to fight the case in
court. See Amanda Woog, Pretrial Detention During a Pandemic Could Be a Death Sen-




2021] Power and Procedure in Texas Bail-Setting 489
quent proceedings.86 For this significant portion of Texans who are
processed through the carceral system without a lawyer, there is quite
literally nobody to help them assert their rights under ODonnell.
The situation is not necessarily less dire for the people who have a law-
yer appointed to represent them. Many Texans are appointed lawyers
that have limited incentive to fight for their pretrial release and some-
times even less capacity to do so, often paid a flat fee of a few hundred
dollars per case no matter how much work they put into it.87 Texas has
largely delegated the Sixth Amendment responsibility of appointing and
funding counsel to individual counties, which have a patchwork of prac-
tices loosely guided by the Fair Defense Act of 2001.88 A 2015 study es-
tablished guidelines for the maximum number of cases that an attorney
could competently represent in one year,89 but in 2020, at least 40% of
people charged with crimes in Texas who had a court-appointed lawyer
were represented by someone whose caseload exceeded that number.90
In some counties, more than 70% of people charged with crimes are rep-
resented by an overburdened attorney.91
An attorney seeking to rectify issues with the initial bail-setting could
employ a number of remedies. She could file a bond-reduction motion for
her client.92 Or she could petition the trial court for a writ of habeas
86. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (West 2017) (“The magistrate shall
also inform the person arrested that . . . any statement made by him may be used against
him.”). This legal requirement is often expanded upon by the magistrate to include an
explicit admonition that they should not or cannot speak. See KARAKATSANIS, supra note
14. Others have argued that this risk of self-incrimination is a factor triggering the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Brief for Appellee at 21, Booth v. Galveston County, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 718 (S.D. Tex. 2019), argued 19-40785 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2020).
87. SIXTH AMEND. CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ARMSTRONG COUNTY & POT-
TER COUNTY, TEXAS: EVALUATION OF ADULT TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE REPRE-
SENTATION 137 (2019), https://sixthamendment.org/6AC/6AC_tx_armstrongpotterreport
_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS8R-HR4E] (“Appointed counsel in Armstrong and Potter
counties rarely attempt to secure pretrial release of their indigent clients who are in cus-
tody. One judge went so far as to declare that lawyers ‘never’ file motions for reduced bail.
Appointed attorneys concede that they do not prepare and argue motions to reconsider
bail on behalf of appointed clients, even though they do so for their retained clients. ‘We
don’t argue bail because we don’t get paid for that.’”).
88. Brandi Grissom, Defenseless, TEX. TRIB. (May 19, 2010), https://
www.texastribune.org/2010/05/19/advocates-texas-indigent-defense-nearing-crisis [https://
perma.cc/3ZMJ-9Q9Z].
89. DOTTIE CARMICHAEL, AUSTIN CLEMENS, HEATHER CASPERS, MINER P.
MARCHBANKS, III & STEVE WOOD, TEX. A&M PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST., GUIDELINES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS: A REPORT TO THE TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMIS-
SION 34 (2015 ), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/8d85e69fd4fb841/guidelines-for-indigent-
defense-caseloads-01222015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W4D-E57N].
90. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 76, at 18. That statistic only counts
court-appointed criminal defense cases, however. After factoring in self-reported time at-
torneys spent on other types of cases, including privately retained work, the number of
people represented by a lawyer with an excessive caseload would be significantly higher.
See id.
91. People’s Sixth Amendment Rights are Being Violated in Harris County Every Day,
RESTORING JUST., https://www.restoringjustice.org/caseloadlimits [https://perma.cc/A396-
J5PG].
92. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.33 (West 1966).
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corpus and then, if necessary, appeal the denial.93 But too few appointed
lawyers take these paths.94 Many never file bond-reduction motions, or if
they do, they submit a form motion with no individualized information
about why the person’s bail should be reduced. Habeas petitions chal-
lenging pretrial detention, and appeals of denials of those petitions, are
even rarer.95
Arrested persons with the right to appeal their case can have a lawyer
assigned to represent them for appeal following a conviction.96 But direct
appeal is not used to challenge convictions based on improper bail-setting
before trial in Texas.97 Even if the claim were raised on appeal, an appel-
late court could not grant adequate relief for improper detention of the
person before trial—even in the rare event that the error was preserved
and records of the bail-setting procedures had not been destroyed by
then. The damage has already been done.
These structural barriers are a significant impediment to ending wealth-
based detention and permit the aggregation of state power in bail-setting.
Judges have virtually unchecked authority to set bail, even when it vio-
lates constitutional law, and they exercise significant control over ap-
pointed counsel, the only actors who are designated by the system to
prevent such abuses. A power-shifting approach will need to contend
93. Defendants have a statutory right to a habeas writ if their bail amount is oppres-
sive. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.24; see also Beck v. State, 648 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (stating appeal lies to court of appeals rather than court of criminal
appeals); Ex parte Williams, 619 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); cf. Ex parte Trillo,
540 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). This is in contrast to the general unavailability
of interlocutory appeals in Texas.
94. SIXTH AMEND. CTR., supra note 87, at 137; PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST.,TEX. A&M
UNIV., BEXAR COUNTY INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM EVALUATION 24 (2020) (finding that
appointed lawyers only filed bail reduction motions in only 3% of cases where the client
was entitled to mandatory release due to delay the filing of an indictment). This is, unfortu-
nately, common across Texas. While we are fortunate to know some fantastically conscien-
tious lawyers who diligently represent their appointed clients despite structural
disincentives, we routinely hear from people all over the state telling us their lawyer either
ignores their requests to seek a bond reduction or affirmatively tells them they refuse to
file one for the client.
95. In Texas there is no interlocutory appeal of a bail reduction motion. Ragston v.
State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(d) (West 2015).
97. It may be, strictly speaking, possible to present such a claim on appeal if the error
was preserved and not waived as part of a plea bargain. Id. art. 44.02 (providing for a
defendant’s right to appeal in criminal cases with substantial limitations on cases resulting
in a guilty plea). Appellate courts in Texas have expansive authority upon a proper filing of
appeal. See Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“Once jurisdiction
of an appellate court is invoked, exercise of its reviewing functions is limited only by its
own discretion or a valid restrictive statute.”). We have been unable to find any Texas post-
conviction appellate cases challenging pretrial bail. When Texas appellate courts do con-
sider bail, it is either on appeal from a denied pretrial writ of habeas corpus or it is a
challenge to the appeal bond set after the person has been convicted. Because it has never
been tested, we do not know whether Texas courts would find that constitutional error in
pretrial bail setting was subject to harmless error review, or whether appellate courts
would search for proof “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
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with and challenge these limitations as part of efforts to end pretrial and
wealth-based detention.
C. POWER-SHIFTING STRATEGIES
This section describes power-shifting strategies already in use by advo-
cates and organizers working to hold court actors accountable. We argue
that these approaches should be considered mechanisms for enforcing
constitutional rights, as well as for providing a vision for pretrial reform.
First, we contend with the role of defense attorneys and offer a vision for
how defenders can work with the community to engage in power-shifting
rather than legitimize or permit the status quo. At their worst, appointed
counsel become arms of the state: failing to diligently represent their cli-
ents while providing the state cover for constitutional and other abuses.
We suggest accountability mechanisms to challenge these defense attor-
neys and the defense systems they operate within. Second, we describe
power-shifting approaches to holding judges accountable for their pretrial
practices, including the routine violations of constitutional law.
1. Role of Defense Counsel
The role of defense counsel pretrial in a power-shifting strategy could
be either as co-conspirator or as target. As co-conspirators, defenders
have worked with organizers on participatory defense campaigns around
bail.98 For example, in San Jose, California, public defenders and or-
ganizers with Silicon Valley De-Bug designed a process meant to disrupt
the lightning-fast bail decisions that were happening in felony arraign-
ments and resulting in 75% of people being caged pretrial.99 Organizers,
families of the accused, and community members would stand in the
courtroom to offer aid and support to those being considered for pretrial
release. In cases that had this intervention, “the rate of . . . release qua-
drupled” and “reliance on set bail amounts dropped by almost half.”100
Advocacy in bail hearings saw similar results, with increases in both bail
reductions and releases without requiring cash bail.101 In the face of the
COVID-19 crisis, Silicon Valley De-Bug and public defenders also
worked together for mass pretrial releases.102 Because the Constitution
98. Participatory defense has power-shifting as an express goal. Raj Jayadev, Janet
Moore & Marla Sandys, Participatory Defense as an Abolitionist Strategy, in TRANSFORM-
ING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN EVIDENCE-BASED AGENDA FOR REFORM 2 (Jon B. Gould &
Pamela Metzger, eds., forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors) (naming “rebalancing





102. Sarah Stillman, Will the Coronavirus Make us Rethink Mass Incarceration?, NEW
YORKER (May 18, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/will-the-
coronavirus-make-us-rethink-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/ZB3B-MP89] (“In mid-
March, as the virus spread, [Raj] Jayadev worked with Carson White, an attorney with the
public defender’s office, who compiled a list of people seeking release from the county jail.
White negotiated with prosecutors, the sheriff’s office, and pretrial services, and an agree-
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requires an individualized assessment before setting bail, community
work building individual narratives can have a profound impact, both for
an individual’s life and for constitutional enforcement.103 Working with
organizers on participatory defense campaigns, defenders can use their
access and skills as attorneys to support community-led campaigns to get
people out of jail and hold judges to the constitutional requirements of
individualized assessments.104
As these examples show, defenders could work with organizers to cre-
ate strategies that not only vindicate individuals’ rights in the pretrial set-
ting but also disrupt business as usual in those courts. In San Jose,
defenders prolonged the hearings at initial bail setting; others could or-
ganize mass motion-filing campaigns or offer free counsel to people in
bail hearings. By disrupting the efficiency of court “processing,” judges
may be forced to contend with demands, for example, to hold bail hear-
ings that meet constitutional requirements.
Defenders can also work with organizers to push for open courts, in-
cluding by filing litigation that would permit courtwatching or otherwise
supporting campaigns that would allow observation of bail hearings.105
Many of the approaches described above are impossible if bail is set in a
closed hearing. Working to open up these courts would address the
threshold issue of lack of access we detail in Section III(A) and comple-
ment community efforts to hold judges and courts accountable described
in Section III(C)(ii).
Unfortunately, appointed defense attorneys are often more like cogs in
the system than co-conspiring disruptors.106 The sheer number of cases
ment was reached to shrink the jail’s population by twenty per cent. On March 19th, the
county released an initial group of about a hundred and fifty people. Since then, the jail’s
population has been reduced by more than a thousand.”).
103. See Moore et al., supra note 61, 1286–87 (2015) (stating the participatory defense
model uses narrative as an organizing tool within courtrooms, such as through social biog-
raphy videos).
104. The legal work described would have a supportive role and would serve the pur-
pose determined by participants and their families and communities. The participatory de-
fense movement deliberately de-centers lawyers and the legal case. Id. at 1285 (“It also is
important to emphasize that family justice hub meetings are not legal clinics. There are no
lawyers in the room. In many respects, that is the point of this new reform model. From a
movement-building perspective, the case outcome is not the only measuring stick. Instead,
it is equally or even more important that the process transform each participant’s sense of
power and agency. For this reason, the participatory defense movement shuns the word
‘client.’ That label reduces people into recipients of services, actions, or change provided or
caused by another. In the participatory defense model, the key actors responsible for creat-
ing change are the people who face charges, along with their families and their
communities.”).
105. For example, in Daves v. Dallas County, which challenged Dallas County’s wealth-
based pretrial detention system, the organizational plaintiffs, Faith in Texas and Texas Or-
ganizing Project, asserted the Sheriff and County violated the First Amendment by deny-
ing public access to legal proceedings where pretrial conditions or release were
determined. First Amended Complaint–Class Action supra note 73, at 60.
106. Jayadev, Moore, and Sandys have described this as the “peculiar sacredness of
public defense . . . how it funnels tax dollars to one group of lawyers (defenders), to make
life easier for other government-paid lawyers (prosecutors and judges), by feeding a gov-
ernment-funded carceral machine, which chews up poor people and people of color, who
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taken by many defense attorneys prevents meaningful, individualized
representation. Flat-fee payment structures incentivize “meet ‘em and
plead ‘em”107 approaches to “defense.”108 A chummy courthouse culture,
in which prosecutors become defense attorneys, who later become
judges—all meeting for happy hour after work—hampers the possibility
of a zealous defense.109 On both individual and systemic levels, defense
counsel can have a legitimizing effect on the fundamentally unfair and
unjust criminal process.110 Thus, it is important to include defense attor-
neys and indigent defense systems as targets in power-shifting strategies
challenging pretrial systems. Below, we outline some such strategies.
The participatory defense strategies described above have also been
used to hold defense attorneys accountable when they fail their clients.111
A court case and the attorney–client relationship can be impossible to
navigate when a person has been appointed an attorney who is not dili-
gently representing them. A person in this situation has her freedom on
the line, but attempts to compel the attorney to work for her are met with
silence, hostility, or even threats.112 Judges in Texas often will not con-
sider pro se motions for replacement counsel because, ironically, the per-
son is represented.113 If the person does manage to have their grievances
lack the political power to fight back.” Jayadev et al., supra note 98, at 14. For problems
around appointment of counsel in Texas, see supra Section III(B).
107. James D. Bethke & Morgan Shell, Public Defense Innovation in Texas, 51 IND. L.
REV. 111, 141 (2018) (“Few would dispute that excessive caseloads impede an attorney’s
ability to provide effective assistance of counsel and often result in a ‘meet and plead’
system of representation. Yet, the problem permeates indigent defense systems in Texas.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting CARMICHAEL ET AL., supra note 89, at 5)).
108. SIXTH AMEND. CTR., supra note 87 (“We don’t argue bail because we don’t get
paid for that.”); see also Fee Schedule, NACOGDOCHES CNTY. (Nov. 20, 2009), http://
tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlan/ViewPlan.aspx?PlanID=149 [https://perma.cc/V7ZQ-Q5S3] (show-
ing that attorneys are paid a flat $150 fee for a guilty plea on a misdemeanor and $250 for a
guilty plea on a felony regardless of other efforts put into the case).
109. In a particularly, jarring example of the dangers of chummy courthouse culture for
people charged with crimes, local defense attorneys were “unfazed” after a Midland prose-
cutor was found to be moonlighting as a judicial clerk—even on some of the same cases he
was prosecuting—with some defense attorneys even defending the scheme. Jessica Priest,
Moonlighting Prosecutor Sent Texas Man to Death Row; 17 Years Later, He Could Get a
New Trial, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/
investigations/2021/02/04/texas-death-row-inmate-could-get-new-trial/4255647001 [https://
perma.cc/3GRT-U4HL] (“‘Ralph is very honorable. He would never tell a judge how to
rule,’ said attorney Tom Morgan, who represented at least 11 defendants in cases in which
Petty later worked for the judges.”).
110. See Michael J. Klarman, Historical Perspectives: Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379,
432 (2009) (“[D]ecisions such as Powell [affirming the right to counsel] . . . may also have
harmed southern blacks by lending legitimacy to a system that remained deeply
oppressive.”).
111. Moore et al., supra note 61, at 1287 (“Participatory defense holds criminal justice
agencies accountable for their acts and omissions. For example, Gail Noble and her seven-
teen-year-old son Karim challenged both a defense lawyer’s failure to investigate and use
available evidence of innocence and a judge’s racist assumptions that Karim’s summer job
was ‘probably selling drugs.’” (italics added)).
112. See MATTHEW CLAIR, PRIVILEGE AND PUNISHMENT: HOW RACE AND CLASS MAT-
TER IN CRIMINAL COURT 73 (2020).
113. E.g., Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[A] trial
court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a defendant who is represented
494 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
heard by the judge, by raising them orally in open court, for example, the
judge often proves extremely hostile to any suggestion that a poor person
should have an attorney of their choice.114 As a result, the attorney can
continue to be unresponsive without fear of any repercussions. In such a
situation, the person charged with a crime is trapped. This is where par-
ticipatory defense has also been effective: it can give a person a lifeline
outside the formal criminal legal system and a way to have grievances
heard. Public campaigns to pressure judges to replace counsel, either in
an individual case or from appointment lists entirely in the case of persis-
tent inadequate representation, are a way to shift power in this context.
Organizers have also pushed for the creation of public defender offices
that would foster ways in which appointed lawyers can be accountable to
the communities they represent.115 Public defender offices—when they
are adequately resourced and independent—can be an antidote to the
structural problems identified above such as overwhelming caseloads,
crony culture, and perverse incentives to plead.116 Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, these kinds of offices have also been consistently shown to provide
better representation than the ad hoc assignment model of providing
counsel.117 They can also have mechanisms for community control and
accountability, such as oversight boards composed of community mem-
bers and directly impacted people and their families, and feedback mech-
anisms from the people and families served by the office.118 Direct
election of chief public defenders is another instrument for accountability
by counsel.”); Hill v. State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (finding no error in
the trial court’s failure to rule on a request for replacement counsel, reasoning that “be-
cause appellant did not request a hearing, no error was presented”).
114. Solis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (“Conflicts of personality
and disagreements between counsel and client are not automatic grounds for withdrawal.
The trial court is under no duty to search for a counsel until an attorney is found who is
agreeable to the accused.”); see also Alexis Hoag, Black on Black Representation, 96
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (describing these hurdles in a section entitled “Beggars
Cannot Be Choosers”). But see Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91
WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (2016) (arguing that, contrary to common opinion, the Supreme
Court has never actually held that there is no right to appointed counsel of choice, and that
it is an essential element of the Sixth Amendment guarantee).
115. See, e.g., Michael Barajas (@michaelsbarajas), TWITTER (May 3, 2019, 4:50 PM),
https://twitter.com/michaelsbarajas/status/1124431077081276420 [https://perma.cc/6T7L-
ERCX] (posting a public defender office proposal from advocates with an oversight board
that would include a significant number of people impacted by the criminal legal system);
Travis County Commissioners vote on public defender office budget and oversight board,
GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (July 30, 2019), https://grassrootsleadership.org/releases/2019/
07/travis-county-commissioners-vote-public-defender-office-budget-and-oversight-board
[https://perma.cc/57NY-4H5Y] (“[W]e will continue to hold our elected officials accounta-
ble by demanding that impacted people be part of every process that impacts us and for
commissioners to invest more in indigent representation instead of throwing more money
into new jail facilities.”).
116. Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1775 (2016) (“[T]he sources of the culture of indifference that affects
too many criminal defenders has structural causes and . . . the structure of criminal defense
in jurisdictions with public defender offices helps fight against that culture.”).
117. TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, PUBLIC DEFENDER PRIMER 8 (2020) (“Studies re-
peatedly find that public defenders improve outcomes.”).
118. See GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, supra note 115.
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sometimes used.119 Many have recognized the importance of public de-
fender offices’ independence from other powerful political players,120
even advocating for a meta-defender office to safeguard public defenders’
independence.121 As part of these proposals, advocates should also con-
sider structures for increased community accountability, so that defender
offices can be accountable to the people they serve and ultimately work
with them to shift power towards those communities.
2. Judiciary
Judges are the most obvious target for power-shifting approaches to
vindicate pretrial constitutional rights because they hold significant
power not only in setting bail in an individual’s case but also in setting
bail policy.122 They are not typical targets in public campaigns, suggesting
relatively untapped potential for organizing to change court practices, es-
pecially in places like Texas where most magistrates are elected, and
those that are not elected are hired by locally elected officials. Consider-
ing the budgetary and policy power judges have—whether in setting bail
policy, controlling public defense structures and budgets,123 or setting cul-
ture and norms in their courtrooms—combined with the relative lack of
public accountability for judges, they are ripe targets for advocacy. Be-
low, we describe strategies already at work in local communities that
could shift power to impacted communities and help enforce existing law:
namely, filing ethics complaints for violations of law and other unethical
behavior, courtwatching, and organizing around judicial elections. The
aim of these strategies is to shift power to directly impacted communities
119. E.g. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18; TEN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-102(b)(1)(A) (2016); S.F.,
CAL. CHARTER § 13.102(b) (2020). However, disenfranchisement laws undermine the abil-
ity of the community impacted by the criminal legal system and the appointed defense
system to participate in electoral accountability.
120. See, e.g., Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, ABA 1 (Feb. 2002),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/le-
gal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3XPJ-2TA5] (“The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment
of defense counsel, is independent.”).
121. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Defend the Public Defenders, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/defend-public-defenders/618001
[https://perma.cc/Y9PF-553A] (arguing for a state-level office to defend public defenders).
122. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1060 (S.D. Tex. 2017)
(ruling that county court at law judges were county policymakers with respect to bail).
123. In Texas, judges hold significant power over public defense structures and funding.
The Chief Judge for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the Chair of the Texas Indigent
Defense Commission, which controls state funding for indigent defense. See Who We Are,
TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, http://www.tidc.texas.gov/about-us/who-we-are [https://
perma.cc/46F5-33GQ]. At the county level, criminal judges control the indigent defense
plan or the county’s plan for providing counsel to people who cannot afford their own
attorney. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(a) (“The judges of the county courts,
statutory county courts, and district courts trying criminal cases in each county, by local
rule, shall adopt and publish written countywide procedures for timely and fairly ap-
pointing counsel for an indigent defendant in the county arrested for, charged with, or
taking an appeal from a conviction of a misdemeanor punishable by confinement or a
felony.”).
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to hold judges accountable for constitutional violations and other court-
room practices.
Every state has a mechanism for holding judges accountable for mis-
conduct.124 While these bodies are notoriously opaque and permissive,125
the act of filing a complaint can nonetheless put judges on notice that
they are being monitored and lead to changed practices. For example, in
Texas, people with ethical complaints against judges can file a complaint
with the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.126 One of the ethical ca-
nons says plainly that “[a] judge shall comply with the law.”127 In October
2020, Texas Fair Defense Project and Texas Civil Rights Project filed a
series of complaints against criminal court judges in Harris County who
were systematically violating the state’s public defender priority stat-
ute.128 Despite the state law requirement that judges prioritize appointing
public defenders when their office has the capacity to take new clients,
these judges were ignoring the law and appointing private attorneys in-
stead, who were making gobs of money off of the county and likely pro-
viding abysmal representation.129 Immediately after the complaints were
filed, and following media coverage of the complaints, practices changed:
In September 2020, 7.8% of criminal appointments went to the public
defender office in Harris County.130 In October 2020, that number was
18.19%.131 This suggests that when judges are exposed to the possibility
of being held personally accountable, they might change their practices.
This strategy alone will likely not create systemic change, but combined
with a broader movement and ongoing monitoring,132 it could help bring
124. Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or
Oaths Remained on the Bench, REUTERS (June 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investi-
gates/special-report/usa-judges-misconduct [https://perma.cc/4Y3D-UR7V] (“Each U.S.
state has an oversight agency that investigates misconduct complaints against judges.”).
125. See generally id.
126. See Complaint Form, STATE COMM’N ON JUD. CONDUCT, http://
www.scjc.texas.gov/public-information/complaint-form [https://perma.cc/A9UY-N8CE].
127. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 2(A).
128. See Samantha Ketterer, Two Harris County District Judges Face Favoritism Allega-
tions in Defense Appointments, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.houstonchroni
cle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/harris-county-judges-favoritism-allegations-
15646882.php [https://perma.cc/S43E-NPLG]. Two more complaints were filed after the
Houston Chronicle article. See Angela Morris, 4 Houston Judges in Hot Seat for Choosing
Private Attorneys over Public Defenders, TEX. LAW. (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.law.com/
texaslawyer/2020/10/28/4-houston-judges-in-hot-seat-for-choosing-private-attorneys-over-
public-defenders [https://perma.cc/8GN2-K5A7].
129. Neel U. Sukhatme & Jay Jenkins, Pay to Play? Campaign Finance and the Incen-
tive Gap in the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel, 70 DUKE L.J. 775, 820, 822, 827 (2021)
(finding that attorneys who donated money to judicial campaigns got significantly more
appointed cases, earned significantly more money off of appointed cases, and achieved
worse results for their clients than attorneys who did not donate money to judges’
campaigns).
130. The Court Appointments Dashboard, JUST. ADMIN. DEP’T, https://jad.harriscounty
tx.gov/Data/The-Court-Appointments-Dashboard [https://perma.cc/2Z68-3XND].
131. Id.
132. County agencies play an important role in creating the transparency needed for
ongoing monitoring. In Harris County, the Justice Administration Department publishes
an online dashboard with real-time data on court appointments, providing essential infor-
mation for research and monitoring. See id.
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judges’ practices in line with established law.
Courtwatching is a practice in which the public monitors courtrooms
and could include monitoring for constitutional violations and organizing
around the observed violations. Organized courtwatching “shift[s] power
and build[s] agency among individuals previously delegated to subjects,
not objects, of the state”133 and “can lead to robust engagement with le-
gal and constitutional meanings.”134 The mere presence of an audience in
a courtroom can also change behavior.135
Courtwatching also has a “constitutional function” as part of the First
Amendment’s guarantee of the public’s right of access and the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to a public trial.136 The
public accountability an audience brings animates these rights.137 The
courtwatcher thus becomes a constitutional enforcer138 and can monitor
for compliance with constitutional requirements, such as individualized
bail hearings that require inquiry into ability to pay. The information ob-
tained through observation could be used to further other accountability
strategies, such as creating public and media campaigns, filing ethical
complaints, and organizing around judicial elections.
Finally, constitutional rights can be enforced through organizing
around the most quintessential democratic tool: “If you don’t like who’s
in there, vote ‘em out.”139 In the majority of states, criminal court judges
133. Jocelyn Simonson, Community and Racial Justice: Democratizing Criminal Justice
Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1618 (2017).
134. Id.
135. Simonson, supra note 62, at 2177.
136. Id. at 2175.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 2176–77. Accountability lies at the core of the audience’s constitutional
functions. Id. at 2177. “Echoing throughout Sixth and First Amendment jurisprudence . . .
is the idea that the function of the public in the criminal courtroom goes beyond the pro-
tection of individuals to implicate the ability of citizens to participate in democracy and to
hold the criminal justice system accountable.” Id. at 2176–77. See also Simonson, supra
note 133, at 1617–18 (“Courtwatching groups affiliated with larger social movements, for
example, gather volunteers to document everyday proceedings in local courts—bond hear-
ings, arraignments, plea bargains—and report to the public the results of their observa-
tions. These community groups become self-appointed watchdogs who can present the
results of their observations in their own words, on their own terms, and independent of
official accounts of policies and trends.”).
139. WILLIE NELSON, VOTE ‘EM OUT (Legacy Recordings 2018); Matthew Clair, Get-
ting Judges on the Side of Abolition, BOS. REV. (July 1, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/law-
justice/matthew-clair-getting-judges-side-abolition [https://perma.cc/PS8M-QRBD] (“More
than half of states elect trial court judges, and judges who are appointed can be swayed by
political pressure and activism.”). Research has suggested that elected judges are more
likely to reflect their ideology of their constituents. Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incen-
tives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges, 103
AM. ECON. REV. 1360, 1361 (2013) (“The sentencing harshness of elected judges is strongly
related to the political ideology of the voters in their districts, while that of appointed
judges is not.”). Larry Krasner’s campaign for District Attorney of Philadelphia provides
an example for mobilizing a broad grassroots coalition against mass incarceration as part of
an electoral campaign, including people and communities directly impacted by incarcera-
tion. Kerry “Shakaboona” Marshall & John Bergen, How prisoners organized to elect a just
DA in Philly, WAGING NONVIOLENCE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://wagingnonviolence.org/2017/
11/prisoners-organized-elect-larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney [https://perma.cc/
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are elected.140 Judicial races are notoriously overlooked; with the electo-
rate relatively uneducated at the ballot box, many argue that judges
should not be elected at all.141 But the answer to an uneducated electo-
rate cannot be concentrating power in the other branches and dis-
empowering local communities to the advantage of elites. Instead, we see
opportunity in the current system to hold judges accountable for unjust
and unconstitutional courtroom practices. Indeed, the recent elections in
Harris County, Texas, demonstrate the power in this opportunity.
In 2018, the criminal judge elections in Harris County centered around
bail reform.142 The Texas Organizing Project had been waging a cam-
paign for significant changes to the county’s bail system and disseminated
disturbing videos from bail hearings showing that “local bond hearing of-
ficers were routinely setting cash bonds for mentally ill and homeless de-
fendants without taking into account their ability to pay.”143 The mostly
Republican county officials and judges refused to settle the pending
ODonnell litigation, and Democratic candidates ran on promises to settle
the lawsuit and bring about massive changes to the cash bail system.144
Running on bail reform and “Black Girl Magic,”145 and riding the “blue
wave” inspired by Beto O’Rourke’s Senate campaign, these candidates
unseated fifteen misdemeanor judges.146 A ground shifting court rule and
settlement resulted in “roughly 85 percent of misdemeanor arrestees [be-
29V4-G6KV] (“In order to shift the race to the left and hold Krasner accountable as he
prepares to take office, a broad coalition of progressive groups put aside their differences
to focus on winning. The leaders of this alliance are the people most impacted by the city’s
justice system, including prisoners in Pennsylvania state prisons.”).
140. Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://judicial-
selectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=trial&phase=first [https://perma.cc/9PNA-M9X6].
141. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,
44–45 (2003). But see Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary,
26(2) J. L., ECON., & ORG. 290, 328 (2010) (measuring judicial performance using three
factors and concluding that “[i]t may be that elected judges are, indeed, superior to ap-
pointed judges. . . . At a minimum, the conventional wisdom needs to be reexamined”).
142. Maura Ewing, Harris County Judges May Face a Reckoning over Bail on Election
Day, THE APPEAL (Nov. 4, 2018), https://theappeal.org/harris-county-judges-may-face-a-
reckoning-over-bail-on-election-day [https://perma.cc/K5Z6-MZLD] (correctly predicting
that the incumbent judges would lose their elections because, at least in part, they refused
to improve the county’s misdemeanor bail system in the face of litigation and public
outcry).
143. Samantha Michaels, Beto O’Rourke Mobilized So Many Democratic Voters That
They Swept Even Local Judges Out of Office, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/11/texas-harris-country-judges-bail-beto-orourke
-juvenile-justice [https://perma.cc/D365-PXJ5]; see also Christopher Connelly, How One
Texas Progressive Group Is Mobilizing Unlikely Black And Latino Voters, KERA NEWS
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.keranews.org/news/2018-10-31/how-one-texas-progressive-
group-is-mobilizing-unlikely-black-and-latino-voters [https://perma.cc/X5S5-8GJH]
(describing Texas Organizing Project’s efforts to mobilize voters from historically
marginalized and disenfranchised communities, including around criminal justice reform).
144. Michaels, supra note 143.
145. Keri Blakinger, The Beto Effect: Transforming Houston’s Criminal Justice System,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/02/25/the-
beto-effect-transforming-houston-s-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/89GF-TQB4].
146. Michaels, supra note 143.
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ing] automatically released without paying [cash bail].”147
IV. CONCLUSION
We cannot leave it to the courts to vindicate the constitutional rights of
low-income people. Rather than looking to the law to solve the shortcom-
ings of the law, we need to recognize the role that power plays in allowing
judges to routinely violate rights. Power-shifting strategies—both inside
and outside the courtroom setting—can hold judges accountable and ulti-
mately shift power to the communities most impacted by unjust and un-
constitutional pretrial systems.
147. Blakinger, supra note 145.
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